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Abstract
A key function of the brain is to interpret noisy sensory information. To do so optimally, observers must, in many tasks, take
into account knowledge of the precision with which stimuli are encoded. In an orientation change detection task, we find
that encoding precision does not only depend on an experimentally controlled reliability parameter (shape), but also
exhibits additional variability. In spite of variability in precision, human subjects seem to take into account precision near-
optimally on a trial-to-trial and item-to-item basis. Our results offer a new conceptualization of the encoding of sensory
information and highlight the brain’s remarkable ability to incorporate knowledge of uncertainty during complex
perceptual decision-making.
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Introduction
The sensory information used by the brain to infer the state of
the world is noisy: when the same stimulus is presented repeatedly,
the neural activity it elicits varies considerably from trial to trial
[1,2,3,4]. As a consequence, an observer’s measurement of a task-
relevant stimulus feature varies as well. The quality of the sensory
information can be numerically expressed as precision. For
instance, when the measurement follows a Gaussian distribution,
precision could be defined as the inverse of the variance of this
Gaussian.
Models of perception routinely assume that the precision with
which a task-relevant stimulus feature is encoded is constant as
long as the stimulus is held constant [5]. It is questionable,
however, whether this assumption is justified, considering that
factors such as fluctuations in alertness [6], configural effects
[7,8], and covert shifts of attention [9,10] could make precision
variable. If all factors were known and quantifiable, encoding
precision could be specified exactly for each stimulus on each
trial. However, as long as we are not able to model each
possible contributing factor, it may be best to model precision
as a random variable [11]. For example, the inverse variance of
a Gaussian noise distribution could be drawn from a gamma
distribution.
If encoding precision is a random variable, then the measure-
ment of a task-relevant stimulus feature follows a doubly stochastic
process. This idea translates to the level of neural coding, where a
population pattern of activity could be Poisson-like with a mean
amplitude (gain) that itself follows some other distribution. Recent
physiological studies have reported evidence for doubly stochastic
processes in cortex [12,13,14,15].
In the optimal-observer models of many tasks, precision does
not only appear as part of the encoding model (a description of
how measurements are generated), but also in the observer’s
decision rule (a description of how measurements are transformed
into a decision). In other words, in some tasks, in order to be
optimal, an observer must take into account precision even if
precision varies unpredictably across stimuli and trials. To
distinguish this type of computation from computation in which
the observer can be optimal using only a point estimate of each
stimulus feature, we use the term ‘‘probabilistic computation’’
[16]. At the neural level, probabilistic computation suggests that
populations of neurons encode and compute with probability
distributions over stimulus features [16,17,18], instead of only
point estimates.
Psychophysical evidence for probabilistic computation has been
found in cue combination tasks [19,20,21] as well as more
complex categorization tasks [22,23]. In these experiments, the
encoding precision of the task-relevant feature was manipulated by
varying a reliability parameter, for example the size of a blurred
disc if its location is task-relevant, or contrast of a bar if its
orientation is task-relevant. Since we propose here that factors
other than this reliability parameter also contribute to variability in
precision, the question arises whether observers optimally take into
account this additional variability.
Here we use a visual change detection task [24,25,26] to study
whether precision is variable for a given value of the reliability
parameter and whether observers take any variability in precision
(whether or not due to the reliability parameter) into account
optimally. Observers reported whether a change in the orientation
of a stimulus occurred between two displays that each contained
four stimuli (items). The reliability of the orientation information
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was controlled by shape and was randomly chosen for each
stimulus. We pitted an optimal-observer model in which precision
is completely determined by shape (‘‘equal precision’’) against one
in which there is additional variability (‘‘variable precision’’). Both
models assume that precision is known and optimally taken into
account by the observer on an item-by-item and trial-by-trial basis.
We compare these two models to several suboptimal models,
where suboptimality can be caused by two factors. First, the
observer might make a wrong assumption about precision. For
example, if precision varies across stimuli at different locations, the
observer might assume a single value of precision for all stimuli
instead of using the individual values. Second, the observer might
use a suboptimal decision rule instead of the optimal rule to
integrate information from different locations. Considering all
combinations of model elements – equal or variable precision,
various observer assumptions about precision, and two possible
integration rules – we arrive at a total of 14 models. We find that
the empirical data for each individual subject are best described by
the model in which precision is variable, the observer knows
precision on an item-by-item and trial-by-trial basis, and uses the
optimal integration rule.
Results
Experiment
Subjects were presented with two consecutive displays, each
presented for 100 ms and separated by a 1-second blank screen.
Each display contained a set of four randomly oriented ellipses
that were identical between both displays except that with 50%
probability, exactly one ellipse changed orientation between the
first and the second screen (Fig. 1A). The magnitude of a change, if
present, was drawn from a uniform distribution. On each trial, we
first randomly chose the number of high-reliability stimuli (0 to 4,
with equal probability); then, we randomly chose which of the
stimuli had high reliability. Reliability was controlled by shape:
high-reliability ellipses were more elongated than low-reliability
ones, but had the same area. Subjects indicated whether or not a
change occurred.
As expected, subjects became better at detecting a change as the
number of high-reliability stimuli, denoted NH, increased (Fig. 1B).
While we did not find a significant effect of NH on the false-alarm
rate (one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, F(2.3,18.6) = 2.9,
p= 0.08; degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity), the effect of NH on the hit rate was
significant (F(1.7,13.9) = 25.1, p,0.001). This shows that our
reliability manipulation was effective. Mean accuracy exceeded
chance at every value of NH (t(8).5.5, p,10
23).
When we separate hit trials by the reliability of the changing
stimulus, we see a distinctive Z-shaped pattern (Fig. 1B). The hit
rate conditioned on the change being in a low-reliability stimulus
decreases monotonically with NH (F(3,24) = 9.7, p,0.001). We did
not find an effect of NH on the hit rate conditioned on the change
being in a high-reliability stimulus (F(1.4,11.6) = 0.20, p= 0.75). It
might be counterintuitive that the low-reliability hit rate decreases
and the high-reliability hit rate is flat, yet the unconditioned hit
rate increases. This effect is an instance of Simpson’s paradox [27].
The apparent contradiction is resolved by realizing that the
relative contributions of the conditional rates change with NH: the
higher NH, the larger the proportion of trials that fall in the high-
reliability-change category. The Z-shaped pattern in our data
confirms a prediction from an optimal model of a change
discrimination task [28] (elaborated below).
Next, we binned change trials by magnitude of change (8 bins)
(Fig. 1C). A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA reveals signif-
icant main effects of magnitude of change (F(7,56) = 109.0,
p,0.001) and of NH (F(1.9,15.2) = 24.4, p,0.001) on the
proportion of ‘‘change’’ reports, and a significant interaction
(F(28,224) = 5.4, p,0.001). This indicates that larger changes are
easier to detect.
Models
We model the observer’s decision process as consisting of an
encoding stage and a decision stage (Fig. 2A). In the encoding
stage, precision is either completely determined by stimulus
reliability (‘‘equal precision’’ or EP), or a random variable itself
(‘‘variable precision’’ or VP). Precision is technically defined as
Fisher information (see Methods) and denoted J. For a given value
of precision, J, the measurement x of an orientation h follows a
probability distribution p(x|h;J). For this distribution, we assume a
circular Gaussian (Von Mises) distribution, characterized by a
concentration parameter k that corresponds one-to-one with
precision (see Text S1 and Fig. S1). When precision is variable
Figure 1. Change detection under varying reliability. A, Schematic of the trial procedure. Stimulus reliability was controlled by ellipse
elongation. Set size was always 4. B, Hit and false-alarm rates as a function of the number of high-reliability stimuli (long ellipses), NH. Hit rates are
split out by whether the changing ellipse had high or low reliability. The Z-shape formed by the yellow, green, and blue lines is an instance of
Simpson’s paradox (see Results). C, Proportion of ‘‘change’’ reports in change trials as a function of the magnitude of change, for different values of
NH. Error bars represent 61 s.e.m.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040216.g001
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(VP), the measurement of a stimulus over many trials is described
by a doubly stochastic process, formalized as the following integral:
p xDhð Þ~
ð
p xDh; Jð Þp Jð ÞdJ, ð1Þ
where p(x|h;J) is again the Von Mises distribution and the
variability in J itself, p(J), is modeled as a gamma distribution
(Fig. 2B). The distribution in Eq. (1) is a mixture of an infinite
number of Von Mises distributions, each with its own precision; it
is a circular analog of the Student t-distribution.
In the decision stage, the Bayes-optimal observer computes on
each trial the probability that a change occurred and responds
‘‘change’’ if this probability is greater than 0.5. This is equivalent
to responding ‘‘change’’ when.
pchange
1{pchange
1
N
XN
i~1
diw1, ð2Þ
where pchange is the observer’s prior belief that a change occurred,
N is the number of stimuli, and di is the local decision variable (i.e.,
the posterior probability ratio of change occurrence at the ith
location, denoted di; see Text S1 for derivation).
di~
I0 kx,ið ÞI0 ky,i
 
I0
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2x,izk
2
y,iz2kx,iky,i cos yi{xið Þ
q  ð3Þ
where xi and yi are the measurements of the i
th stimulus in the first
and second displays, respectively, kx,i and ky,i are the correspond-
ing concentration parameters of the noise, and I0 is the modified
Bessel function of the first kind of order 0. Eq. (3) represents
‘‘weighting’’ by encoding precision (through kx,i and ky,i) on a trial-
by-trial and item-by-item basis, in a way analogous to but more
complex than cue combination. It is crucial that the optimal
observer knows precision, J, and therefore k, for each display and
each item on each trial. Thus, even though Eq. (1) describes a
doubly stochastic process over many trials, the optimal observer on
a single trial knows the exact conditioned distribution p(x|h,J).
In the decoding stage, the models we consider differ along two
dimensions that can be understood in the context of Eqs. (3) and
(2), respectively. The first dimension concerns the assumption that
the observer makes about encoding precision:
1. no assumption: complete knowledge of an item’s precision on
each trial, i.e. the optimal model;
2. the assumption that precision is completely determined by
shape, ignoring any other variability (suboptimal);
3. the assumption that precision is equal to the average precision
across the display (which will vary across trials), reflecting a
‘‘gist’’ representation of precision (suboptimal);
4. the assumption that precision is equal throughout the
experiment, thus ignoring both variations in shape and other
variability (suboptimal).
If encoding precision is equal (EP), assumptions 1 and 2 are
equivalent, because there is no additional variability to ignore.
Assumptions 2 to 4 are formalized as variants of Eq. (3) in which
the trial-to-trial and item-to-item concentration parameters are
replaced by values that are solely determined by stimulus
Figure 2. A, Flow diagram of the decision process. Models differ along three dimensions: whether precision is equal or variable, the observer’s
assumption about precision, and the observer’s integration rule. B, Examples of probability density functions over encoding precision for a high-
reliability and a low-reliability stimulus (long and short ellipse, respectively) in the variable-precision model. Dashed lines indicate the means. C, The
generative model shows statistical dependencies between variables. C: change occurrence (0 or 1); D: magnitude of change; D: vector of change
magnitudes at all locations; h and Q: vectors of stimulus orientations in the first and second displays, respectively; x and y: vectors of measurements
of the stimulus orientations. The spatial, temporal, and structural complexities of the task can be recognized in the vector nature of the orientation
variables, the two ‘‘branches’’, and the number of layers, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040216.g002
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reliability, by the average value in the display, or by a single value
throughout the experiment, respectively.
The second dimension along which the models differ is the
integration rule that the observer applies to the local decision
variables, di. Specifically, besides the optimal rule, Eq. (2), we
consider the suboptimal ‘‘Max’’ rule, according to which the
observer responds based on the largest local decision variable. The
Max decision rule ismax
i
diwk, with k a constant criterion. The Max
rule has been used widely in signal detection theory models of visual
search and is considered a reasonable description of human search
behavior [29,30,31,32] (but see [22]). The Max model together with
the assumption of single precision (Assumption 4) is equivalent to the
(also suboptimal) maximum-absolute-differences model we intro-
duced for change detection in earlier work [33] (see Text S1). In
total, this produces (4+3)?2 = 14 models, listed in Table 1. The
number of free parameters ranges from 3 to 5.
Model Comparison
We compared the models in two ways. First, we fitted each
model’s parameters using maximum-likelihood estimation and
computed R2 for the fits to the data in Fig. 1B-C (Fig. 3). The
winning model was the one in which encoding precision is
variable, observers optimally weight observations by their encod-
ing precision, and they use the optimal rule for integrating
information across locations (the VVO model from Table 1). This
model had the highest goodness-of-fit for hit and false-alarm rates
(R2 = 0.97), as well as for psychometric curves (R2 = 0.89).
Maximum-likelihood estimates of model parameters are given in
Table S1.
Second, to distinguish the models in a more powerful way, we
performed Bayesian model comparison [34]. This method
computes the average likelihood over all parameter combinations,
thereby automatically correcting for the number of free param-
eters (see Online Methods). The VVO model is the clear winner
for each of the 9 subjects individually. Bayesian model comparison
revealed that the log likelihood of the VVO model exceeds that of
the next best model (VVM, which uses the Max rule) by the
decisive difference of 15.4617.3 (mean and s.e.m.) log likelihood
points (Fig. 4).
The VVO model exceeds the EEO model – the best equal-
precision model – by 36.366.3 log likelihood points, suggesting
variability in encoding precision. To confirm that this advantage is
not due to unmodeled noise at the decision level (the last two steps
in Fig. 2A), we tested two EEO model variants that included such
noise. In the first variant (‘‘local decision noise’’), we added zero-
mean Gaussian noise with standard deviation slocal to the log of
the local decision variable, di. In the second variant (‘‘global
decision noise’’), we added the same type of noise (with standard
deviation sglobal) to the log of the left-hand side of Eq. (2). The
best-fitting values were slocal = 0.3460.04 and sglobal = 0.3060.08.
These values are small given that log decision variables generally
ranged from about 24 to 20. Furthermore, we computed the
model likelihoods of these two variants, and compared them to
that of the winning model, VVO. The EEO models with local and
global decision noise had log likelihoods of 237.167.0 and
238.267.0 relative to VVO, respectively. Moreover, the VVO
model described the data better than both noisy models in all nine
subjects individually. Thus, decision noise cannot account for the
difference between the VVO and EEO models.
Simpson’s Paradox
As Fig. 3A shows, the VVO model accounts for the
characteristic Z-shape in the hit rates. The intuition behind the
Z-shape in the context of the VVO model – and in fact any model
that weights observations by their encoding precision – is as
follows. The unconditioned hit rate increases with the number of
high-reliability stimuli, NH, because more information is available
in the measurements, and the observer utilizes this information.
The hit rate conditioned on the changing item having low
reliability decreases with increasing NH because a higher value of
NH means that more non-changing items have high reliability.
Since in the VVO model, more precise measurements influence
the decision more strongly, the overall evidence for ‘‘no change’’
becomes stronger and subjects become less likely to report
‘‘change’’. Our result confirms a prediction from an earlier
Bayesian model of change discrimination [28] and provides
additional evidence for probabilistic computation by humans in
change detection.
Discussion
We have found that in detecting a change among multiple
stimuli: a) the encoding precision of a stimulus is variable even for
a given value of stimulus reliability; b) observers near-optimally
take into account both variations in stimulus reliability and the
additional variability. These results raise several issues.
First, we modeled the distribution of encoding precision as a
gamma distribution, with precision being independent across
locations and trials. While this choice was convenient and led to
good fits, alternatives to the gamma and independence assump-
tions must be considered.
Second, what causes variability in encoding precision? Several
possible factors were mentioned in the introduction. In addition,
the precision of memorized items could decay in variable ways, or
precision could simply depend on the task-relevant feature value
[35]. The relative contributions of these factors remain to be
determined.
Third, variability in precision may have implications for
encoding models in other tasks. It could potentially account for
subject responses that are usually modeled as lapses, since those
correspond to a precision of zero. Moreover, in cue combination,
it has been suggested that sensory noise is best described by a
mixture of a Gaussian and a uniform distribution [36] or of two
Gaussian distributions [37]. These mixture models can be
regarded as approximations to a full-fledged doubly stochastic
process as in Eq. (1), since the mixture components correspond to
two different values of precision.
Fourth, how variability in precision can be recognized in neural
activity depends on the neural coding scheme one subscribes to. In
the framework of Poisson-like probabilistic population codes,
variability in encoding precision might correspond to variability in
population gain [18,38]. There is initial evidence that gain does
vary [12,13,14], and this variability might in part be due to
attentional factors [39,40,41,42]. Neuroimaging studies have
found that trial-to-trial fluctuations in perceptual performance
correlate with fluctuations in stimulus-independent, ongoing
neural activity in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, and dorsal parietal areas [43,44]. This activity
might in part reflect the attentional state of the observer, in which
case their fluctuations might partially account for variability in
precision.
Fifth, how can a neural population ‘‘know’’ encoding precision
for use in decision-making? Again in probabilistic population
coding, a neural population encodes on each trial a full likelihood
function over the stimulus, whose inverse width represents the
precision/certainty associated with that stimulus on that trial [18].
Thus, encoding precision is implicitly known on a trial-by-trial
basis and can be used in downstream computation. A next step
Inference under Variable Precision
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would be to use probabilistic population codes to design a neural
network that takes Poisson-like representations of the individual
stimuli in both displays as input and has an output layer that
encodes the probability that a change occurred (potentially in the
medial temporal lobe [45]).
Our work illustrates a new role for change detection in
psychology. Traditionally, change detection has only been used
to probe capacity limitations in short-term memory [25,46,47,48].
Viewing change detection as inference on noisy sensory measure-
ments is relatively new [33]. Here, we have demonstrated the use
of change detection in studying whether the brain computes with
probability distributions. Behavioral evidence for probabilistic
computation had so far been largely limited to tasks with relatively
simple statistical structures, such as cue combination. Change
detection is a case study of complex inference, because of the
presence of multiple relevant stimuli (spatial complexity), because
stimulus information must be integrated into an abstract
categorical judgment (structural complexity), and because percep-
tion interacts with visual short-term memory (temporal complex-
ity).
A final caveat. It is tempting to equate optimality with the
notion that the brain computes with probabilities on an individual-
trial basis (probabilistic computation). These are, however,
orthogonal notions [16,49]. In some tasks, such as judging
whether an oriented stimulus is tilted to the left or to the right,
optimality can be attained using only point estimates and does not
require trial-by-trial representations of probability. Conversely, an
observer might take into account precision – and perhaps
represent probability – on a trial-by-trial and item-by-item basis,
but do so in a suboptimal way. Here, we have provided evidence
for both optimality and probabilistic computation in change
detection. To test for probabilistic computation, we varied
reliability unpredictably without giving trial-to-trial feedback,
and compared models in which the observer does or does not
Table 1. List of models considered.
Model Precision Local decision variable (di) Decision rule #Pars
VVO variable I0 kx,ið ÞI0 ky,i
 
I0
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2x,izk
2
y,iz2kx,iky,i cos yi{xið Þ
q  with ki the actual value atthe ith location pchange1{pchange
1
N
XN
i~1
diw1
4
VEO variable I0 kx,ið ÞI0 ky,i
 
I0
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2x,izk
2
y,iz2kx,iky,i cos yi{xið Þ
q  with ki either klow or khigh pchange
1{pchange
1
N
XN
i~1
diw1
4
VAO variable I0 kxð ÞI0 ky
 
I0
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2xzk
2
yz2kxky cos yi{xið Þ
q  where k is an average overlocations pchange1{pchange
1
N
XN
i~1
diw1
4
VSO variable I0 kassumedð Þ2
I0 kassumed
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2z2 cos yi{xið Þ
p  pchange
1{pchange
1
N
XN
i~1
diw1
5
VVM variable I0 kx,ið ÞI0 ky,i
 
I0
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2x,izk
2
y,iz2kx,iky,i cos yi{xið Þ
q  with ki the actual value atthe ith location maxi diwk 4
VEM variable I0 kx,ið ÞI0 ky,i
 
I0
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2x,izk
2
y,iz2kx,iky,i cos yi{xið Þ
q  with ki either klow or khighmaxi diwk 4
VAM variable I0 kxð ÞI0 ky
 
I0
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2xzk
2
yz2kxky cos yi{xið Þ
q  where k is an average overlocations maxi diwk 4
VSM variable I0 kassumedð Þ2
I0 kassumed
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2z2 cos yi{xið Þ
p  maxi diwku
max
i
Dyi{xi Dw~k
4
EEO equal I0 kið Þ2
I0 ki
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2z2 cos yi{xið Þ
p  with ki either klow or khigh pchange
1{pchange
1
N
XN
i~1
diw1
3
EAO equal I0 kð Þ2
I0 k
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2z2 cos yi{xið Þ
p  where k is an average overlocations pchange1{pchange
1
N
XN
i~1
diw1
3
ESO equal I0 kassumedð Þ2
I0 kassumed
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2z2 cos yi{xið Þ
p  pchange
1{pchange
1
N
XN
i~1
diw1
4
EEM equal I0 kið Þ2
I0 ki
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2z2 cos yi{xið Þ
p  with ki either klow or khighmaxi diwk 3
EAM equal I0 kð Þ2
I0 k
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2z2 cos yi{xið Þ
p  where k is an average overlocations maxi diwk 3
ESM equal I0 kassumedð Þ2
I0 kassumed
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2z2 cos yi{xið Þ
p  maxi diwku
max
i
Dyi{xi Dw~k
3
The first letter stands for variable (V) or equal (E) encoding precision. The second letter indicates the observer’s assumption about encoding precision (V: variable; E:
equal; A: sample average over locations; S: single value). The third letter stands for the optimal (O) or Max (M) integration rule. The equivalences (u) in the VSM and FSM
models are explained in the Text S1; the notation |?| denotes circular distance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040216.t001
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take into account precision on a trial-by-trial and item-by-item
basis. To test for optimality, we compared the optimal decision
rule against a plausible suboptimal one, the Max rule. Thus, we
were to some extent able to disentangle Bayesian optimality from
probabilistic computation. We speculate that as task complexity
increases, optimality will break down at some point, but
probabilistic computation continues to be performed – in other
words, humans are suboptimal, probabilistic observers.
Methods
Stimuli
Stimuli were displayed on a 210 LCD monitor at a viewing
distance of 60 cm. Each stimulus display contained four oriented
ellipses. Two types of ellipses were used: ‘‘long’’ and ‘‘short’’ ones.
‘‘Long’’ ellipses had minor and major axes of 0.37 and 1.02
degrees of visual angle (deg), respectively. ‘‘Short’’ ellipses had the
same area, but their elongations were determined separately for
each subject (see Procedure). On each trial, ellipse centers were
chosen by placing one at a random location on an imaginary circle
of radius 7 deg around the screen center, placing the next one 90u
Figure 3. Fits of all 14 models to the data in Fig. 1B-C (axis labels and scales as there). VP = variable precision; EP = equal precision; AP =
average precision; SP = single precision. Error bars and shaded areas represent 61 s.e.m. in the data and the model, respectively. The number in
each plot is the R2 of the fit (for the left plot in each pair, computed over false-alarm rates and unconditioned hit rates). Frame color indicates model
goodness of fit relative to the winning model, as obtained from Bayesian model comparison (Fig. 4).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040216.g003
Figure 4. Log likelihood of each model relative to the VVO
model. Negative values indicate that the model is less likely than the
VVO model. Error bars represent s.e.m. Abbreviations and color scheme
are as in Table 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040216.g004
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counterclockwise from the first along the circle, etc., until all four
ellipses had been placed. This spacing was sufficiently large to
avoid crowding effects. Each ellipse position was jittered by a
random amount between 20.3 and 0.3 deg in x- and y-directions
(independently). Stimulus and background luminances were 95.7
and 33.1 cd/m2, respectively.
Subjects
Nine subjects participated (6 naı¨ve, 3 authors; 1 female). All
were between 22 and 32 years old and had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. The study was approved by the Institutional
Review Board for Human Subject Research for Baylor College of
Medicine; all subjects gave written informed consent.
Procedure
There were three types of trial blocks: testing blocks, practice
blocks, and threshold blocks. In each testing block, a trial began
with a blank screen displaying a central fixation cross for 1000 ms.
The first stimulus display was presented for 100 ms, followed by a
delay period of 1000 ms, followed by a second stimulus display for
100 ms. On each trial, the number of long ellipses was chosen
randomly with equal probability from 0 to 4. The locations of the
long ellipses were chosen randomly given the constraint of their
total number; all other ellipses were short. The orientation of each
ellipse was drawn independently from a uniform distribution over
all possible orientations. The second stimulus display was identical
to the first, except that there was a 50% chance that one of the
ellipses had changed its orientation by an angle drawn from a
uniform distribution over all possible orientations. Following the
second display, the observer pressed a key to indicate whether
there was a change between the first and second displays. A
response caused the next trial to begin. No trial-by-trial feedback
was given. A practice block was identical to a testing block, except
that all stimuli on a given trial had the same reliability, which was
varied randomly across trials. Stimulus presentation time was
initially 333 ms and decreased by 33 ms every 32 trials, allowing
the observer to easy into the task. Feedback was given on each
trial. The practice session consisted of 256 trials. A threshold block
was identical to a practice block but used only the shortest stimulus
presentation time (100 ms), and was 400 trials in length.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were informed in lay
terms about the distributions from which the stimuli were drawn
(e.g., ‘‘The change is equally likely to be of any magnitude.’’). Each
observer completed three sessions on separate days. The first
session began with a practice block only for naı¨ve subjects. All
subjects then did one threshold block of 400 trials. We fitted a
cumulative normal distribution to accuracy as a function of ellipse
elongation and extrapolated the performance to the maximal
elongation. If the resulting performance was equal to or greater
than 75%, we found the elongation of a ‘‘short’’ ellipse from the
65% correct point of the fitted curve. If the resulting extrapolated
performance was lower than 75%, the observer repeated the
threshold block. If extrapolated performance on the repeated
block was again lower than 75%, the observer was excluded from
the study. Testing blocks had 400, 800, and 800 testing trials per
session, respectively. There were two timed breaks spread evenly
for the 400-trial session and four in the 800-trial ones. During each
break, a screen showing the percentage correct in the block was
displayed. Cumulative performance was shown at the end of each
session.
Encoding Model
For convenience, all orientations were remapped from [2p/
2,p/2) to [2p,p). For a true stimulus orientation h, we assumed
the measurement x to follow a Von Mises distribution,
p xDh; kð Þ~ 1
2pI0 kð Þ e
k cos x{hð Þ, where k is the concentration
parameter. k is determined by the amount of resource allocated
to the stimulus, J. The relationship between J and k is J~k
I1 kð Þ
I0 kð Þ,
where I1 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind of order 1
(see Text S1). In the EP model, J is determined by ellipse elongation
only. In the VP model, J is drawn from a gamma distribution with
mean J and scale parameter t, where J is determined by ellipse
elongation (it is accordingly denoted Jlow or Jhigh).
Model Predictions
We are interested in computing the probability predicted by a
model of reporting ‘‘change’’ for a set of stimuli and corresponding
reliabilities, given a set of parameter values. This probability is
equal to the probability that d.1 for measurements (x,y) drawn
using the generative model with the given parameters. This
probability only depends on the magnitude of change, D, the
number of high-reliability stimuli, NH, and whether a change, if
any, occurred in a low-reliability or a high-reliability stimulus. We
binned D every 3 degrees between 0 and 90 degrees, resulting in
31 values; NH takes 5 possible values, resulting in 31?5?2 = 310 trial
types. For each trial type, we approximated the distributions of x
and y using a Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 samples. For
each sample, the model’s decision rule was applied, and the
proportion of ‘‘change’’ responses among all samples was
determined. This returned an estimate of the model’s probability
of reporting ‘‘change’’ on a given trial, for the given parameter
values. The entire procedure was repeated for all parameter
combinations.
Model Fitting
For a given model, we denote the vector of model parameters by
t. The likelihood of t is the probability of the human subject’s
empirical responses given t:
L tð Þ~p dataDt,hð Þ~ P
Ntrials
k~1
p C^kDstimulik,t
 
,
where Ntrials is the total number of trials, C^k the subject’s response
on the kth trial, and stimulik is shorthand for the stimulus
orientations and their reliabilities in both displays. The maxi-
mum-likelihood estimate of the parameters is the value of t that
maximizes L(t).
Bayesian Model Comparison
Each model m produces a prediction about the response on each
trial, p(C^k|stimulik,t,m). Bayesian model comparison [34] consists
of calculating for each model the probability of finding a subject’s
actual responses under this distribution, averaged over free
parameters:
L mð Þ~p dataDmð Þ~
ð
p dataDm,tð Þp tDmð Þdt
~
ð
P
Ntrials
k~1
p C^k Dstimulik,t,m
  !
p tDmð Þdt
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It is convenient to compute the logarithm of L(m) and write it as.
logL mð Þ~L mð Þz log
ð
eL t,mð Þ{L
 mð Þp tDmð Þdt, ð4Þ
where L t,mð Þ~
XNtrials
k~1
log p C^k Dstimulik,t,m
 
and L mð Þ~
max
t
L t,mð Þ: This form prevents numerical problems, since the
exponential in the integrand of Eq. (4) is now of order 1 near the
maximum-likelihood value of t. For the parameter prior, we
assume a uniform distribution across some range, whose size we
denote Rj for the j
th parameter. Ranges were as follows: [1,100] for
Jlow, Jhigh, Jassumed, Jlow, and Jhigh; [1,30] for t; [22.2, 51.8] for
the Max model criterion k; [0.3, 0.7] for pchange. Eq. (4) becomes
logL mð Þ~L mð Þ{ Pdim t
j~1
logRjz log
Ð
eL t,mð Þ{L
 mð Þdt, where dim
t is the number of parameters. We approximated the integral
through a Riemann sum. We tested the parameter fitting and
model comparison code on fake data generated from each of the
14 models; parameters were estimated correctly and the model
used to generate the data always won, showing that the models are
distinguishable using this method.
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